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FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

2006 OCT 30 P 3:42

James Richard White, #258862,	)	C. A. No. 2:06-0518-GRA-RSC
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
-versus-	)	<b><u>REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION</u></b>
	)	
Jon Ozmint, Director of South	)	
Carolina Department of	)	
Corrections; Kenneth McKellar,	)	
Warden and Derwin Neasman,	)	
Major,	)	
	)	
Defendants.	)	

The pro se plaintiff brought this civil rights action on February 27, 2006, with a Houston v. Lack delivery date of February 17, 2006. On March 1, 2006, the undersigned entered a Report and Recommendation recommending that the court dismiss the action without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. Thereafter, on April 4, 2006, the Honorable G. Ross Anderson, Jr., United States District Judge, remanded the action to the magistrate judge for a determination on the merits.

An order was entered on April 17, 2006, authorizing service of process and collection of a filing fee by the clerk, directing the defendants to answer or otherwise plead, and directing the plaintiff to notify the clerk in writing of any change of address. The defendants filed an answer on May 30, 2006.

On August 30, 2006, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. By order of this court filed September 6, 2006, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir.

1975), the plaintiff was advised of dismissal and summary judgment procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately. As the plaintiff has failed to respond to the motion for summary judgment, it appears to the court that he wishes to abandon this action.

As the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court filed a second order on October 13, 2006, giving the plaintiff an additional ten (10) days in which to file his response to the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff was specifically advised that if he failed to respond, this action may be dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute, Davis v. Williams, 588 F.2d 69, 70 (4th Cir. 1978), 41(b) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff did not respond.

Based on the foregoing, it appears the plaintiff no longer wishes to pursue this action. Accordingly, it is recommended that this action be dismissed with prejudice for lack of prosecution.

Respectfully Submitted,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Robert S. Carr".

Robert S. Carr  
United States Magistrate Judge

Charleston, South Carolina

October 30, 2006

**Notice of Right to File Objections to Magistrate Judge's "Report and Recommendation"****&**  
**The *Serious Consequences* of a Failure to Do So**

The parties are hereby notified that any objections to the attached Report and Recommendation (or Order and Recommendation) must be filed within **ten (10) days** of the date of its filing. 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The time calculation of this ten-day period excludes weekends and holidays and provides for an additional three days for filing by mail. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. Based thereon, this Report and Recommendation, any objections thereto, and the case file will be **delivered to a United States District Judge** fourteen (14) days after this Report and Recommendation is filed. Advance Coating Technology, Inc. v. LEP Chemical, Ltd., 142 F.R.D. 91, 94 & n. 3, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS® 6243 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). A magistrate judge makes only a recommendation, and the authority to make a final determination in this case rests with the United States District Judge. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-271 (1976); and Estrada v. Witkowski, 816 F. Supp. 408, 410, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS® 3411 (D.S.C. 1993).

During the ten-day period, **but not thereafter**, a party must file with the Clerk of Court specific, written objections to the Report and Recommendation, if he or she wishes the United States District Judge to consider any objections. **Any written objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections.** See Keeler v. Pea, 782 F. Supp. 42, 43-44, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS® 8250 (D.S.C. 1992); and Oliverson v. West Valley City, 875 F. Supp. 1465, 1467, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS® 776 (D.Utah 1995). Failure to file specific, written objections shall constitute a waiver of a party's right to further judicial review, including appellate review, if the recommendation is accepted by the United States District Judge. See United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 & n. 4 (4th Cir.), *cert. denied*, Schronce v. United States, 467 U.S. 1208 (1984); and Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 845-847 & nn. 1-3 (4th Cir. 1985). Moreover, if a party files specific objections to a portion of a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation, but does not file specific objections to other portions of the Report and Recommendation, that party waives appellate review of the portions of the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation to which he or she did not object. In other words, a party's failure to object to one issue in a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation precludes that party from subsequently raising that issue on appeal, even if objections are filed on other issues. Howard v. Secretary of HHS, 932 F.2d 505, 508-509, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS® 8487 (6th Cir. 1991). See also Praylow v. Martin, 761 F.2d 179, 180 n. 1 (4th Cir.) (party precluded from raising on appeal factual issue to which it did not object in the district court), *cert. denied*, 474 U.S. 1009 (1985). In Howard, *supra*, the Court stated that general, non-specific objections are *not* sufficient:

A general objection to the entirety of the [magistrate judge's] report has the same effects as would a failure to object. The district court's attention is not focused on any specific issues for review, thereby making the initial reference to the [magistrate judge] useless. \* \* \* This duplication of time and effort wastes judicial resources rather than saving them, and runs contrary to the purposes of the Magistrates Act. \* \* \* We would hardly countenance an appellant's brief simply objecting to the district court's determination without explaining the source of the error.

Accord Lockert v. Faulkner, 843 F.2d 1015, 1017-1019 (7th Cir. 1988), where the Court held that the appellant, who proceeded *pro se* in the district court, was barred from raising issues on appeal that he did not specifically raise in his objections to the district court:

Just as a complaint stating only 'I complain' states no claim, an objection stating only 'I object' preserves no issue for review. \* \* \* A district judge should not have to guess what arguments an objecting party depends on when reviewing a [magistrate judge's] report.

See also Branch v. Martin, 886 F.2d 1043, 1046, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS® 15,084 (8th Cir. 1989) ("no de novo review if objections are untimely or general"), which involved a *pro se* litigant; and Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 7 n. 1 (3rd Cir. 1984) ("plaintiff's objections lacked the specificity to trigger *de novo* review"). **This notice, hereby, appraises the parties of the consequences of a failure to file specific, written objections.** See Wright v. Collins, *supra*; and Small v. Secretary of HHS, 892 F.2d 15, 16, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS® 19,302 (2nd Cir. 1989). Filing by mail pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections addressed as follows:

Larry W. Propes, Clerk  
United States District Court  
Post Office Box 835  
Charleston, South Carolina 29402

